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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the effects of corporate governance on company performance 
and dividends paid by the company. In developing countries where the protection system 
against public investors is still weak, corporate governance becomes important. This study 
uses a sample of manufacturing companies in three developing countries. i.e., Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. The variables that represent corporate governance are board 
characteristics and ownership structure. Board characteristics comprise board size, 
independent board, and board gender, while the ownership structure uses managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership. The results show that in Indonesia, corporate 
governance has no significant effect on company performance and dividends. In comparison, 
in Malaysia, the female board has a positive effect on both performance and dividends paid. 
Whereas in Thailand, institutional ownership has a negative effect both on performance and 
dividends paid. The results also consistently show that debt and company size have an effect 
on performance and dividends in the three countries. 
Keywords:  board size; independent board; board gender; managerial ownership; institutional 
ownership. 
Abstrak 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi pengaruh dari tata kelo9la terhadap kinerja 
dan deviden yang dibayarkan perusahaan. Di Negara berkembang dimana sistem 
perlindungan terhadap investor publik masih lemah, maka tata kelola perusahaan menjadi 
hal penting. Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel perusahaan manufaktur yang terdapat di 
tiga Negara berkembang yaitu Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Thailand. Variabel yang mewakili 
tata kelola adalah karakteristik dewan komisaris dan struktur kepemilikan. Karakteristik 
dewan komisaris akan menggunakan  ukuran dewan komisaris, komisaris independent dan 
diversitas gender, sedangkan struktur kepemilikan menggunakan kepemilikan manajerial dan 
kepemilikan institusi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan di Indonesia, tatakelola tidak memiliki 
pengaruh signifikan baik terhadap kinerja dan dividends. Sementara, di Malaysia, 
keberadaan komisaris wanita memiliki pengaruh positif baik terhadap kinerja dan deviden 
yang dibayarkan. Di Thailand, kepemilikan institusi memeiliki pengaruh negatif terhadap 
kinerja dan dividen. Hasil penelitian juga menunjukkan bahwa utang dan ukuran perusahaan 
memiliki pengaruh terhadapkinerja dan dividen di ketiga Negara.     
Kata Kunci: ukuran dewan komisaris, komisaris independen, jender komisaris, kepemilikan 
manajerial, kepemilikan institusi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many researchers have studied the 
effects of corporate governance on 
company performance and dividends. 
However, the study results in developing 
countries are still mixed. Good corporate 
governance is believed to make the 
company's performance better and have an 
impact on dividend payments by the 
company. The discussion of corporate 
governance becomes interesting, especially 
in developing countries. Developing 
countries where law enforcement against 
corporate actions has not been optimal may 
lead to conflict between management and 
public shareholders. In order to reduce 
agency costs from the conflict, 
strengthening governance in each company 
is critical. There have been many studies 
related to corporate governance, but the 
results are still mixed until now. 
Corporate governance itself cannot 
be visibly seen by public investors. Public 
investors know whether the corporate 
governance is good or not, depends on the 
information provided by the company and 
the possibility of complaints from 
consumers or other stakeholders. In capital 
markets in developing countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, there is 
not much governance information that 
investors can obtain. Investors will assess 
corporate governance through annual 
reports submitted to investors through the 
management and discussion analysis. From 
management and discussion analysis, 
investors can get information from the 
statement of the board of commissioners, 
the composition of the board of 
commissioners, and the ownership 
structure. This information is usually 
published once a year unless there is an 
extraordinary event leading to price 
movements, which makes the company 
declares the information. Based on these 
thoughts, this study will examine whether 
corporate governance directly affects 
dividends paid or whether corporate 
governance affects dividends through 
company performance. This means that 
good governance will have an impact on 
good company performance, and this good 
performance will affect the dividends paid 
to shareholders. This research also 
investigates the condition of corporate 
governance in three developing ASEAN 
countries and its effects on company 
performance and dividends paid. 
Good corporate governance will lead 
to good company performance. Companies 
with good governance will try to protect 
the interests of stakeholders. Governance 
itself can be reflected in various ways, that 
is the composition of the board of 
commissioners  (Al Farooque, Buachoom, 
& Sun, 2020; Buallay, 2019; Kowalewski, 
2016; Puni & Anlesinya, 2020; Saidat, 
Silva, & Seaman, 2019; Suttipun, 2018)  
and the ownership structure (Buallay, 
2019; Kabir & Thai, 2017; Puni & 
Anlesinya, 2020; Saidat et al., 2019). 
Studies on corporate governance related to 
the composition of the board of 
commissioners can be in the form of the 
size of the board of commissioners and the 
presence of independent commissioners 
and female commissioners. Companies 
with a large board of commissioners, on 
the one hand, are positive by enabling 
more supervision by the commissioners, 
but on the other hand, the size of the board 
of commissioners can have a negative 
impact where decision-making is more 
complex. Meanwhile, independent 
commissioners are believed to provide 
positive benefits in terms of company 
supervision and are expected to be able to 
protect the interests of public investors. 
However, several studies also show that 
independent commissioners have no 
impact on company performance, 
especially in countries with the legal 
system where the commissioner's decision 
must be one. In these countries, the 
independent commissioners will often be 
inferior to affiliated commissioners. 
Meanwhile, the presence of female 
commissioners is considered capable of 
giving a positive impact on company 
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performance. Females are considered able 
to balance male commissioners' 
aggressiveness so that their existence can 
provide better control to the company. 
Besides the composition of the board 
of commissioners, the ownership structure 
also plays a role in supervising the 
company. Companies owned by insti-
tutional investors will be more closely 
monitored than companies owned by 
individual investors. The existence of 
institutional ownership with the resources 
in it will help the company to supervise 
better. However, several other studies 
show the opposite results, where high 
institutional ownership tends to perform 
earnings management aimed at reducing 
taxes. Meanwhile, managerial ownership 
in the company will also make the 
company well managed. Managers who 
also own company shares will have a sense 
of belonging so that they will manage the 
company more carefully. Nevertheless, 
there is also a contradiction where high 
managerial ownership tends to make 
companies reduce dividend payers and 
prioritize retained earnings for developing 
the companies. Successful company 
development will have an impact on top 
management in the form of an increase in 
company size, which implies an increase in 
compensation, and because top manage-
ment owns shares, they will get capital 
gains from an increase in share prices. The 
combination of institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership will have a positive 
effect on company performance. 
From the abovementioned explana-
tion, it can be seen that good corporate 
governance should be able to improve 
company performance. Investors will see 
the company performance improvement 
through the increase in dividends they 
receive. Nonetheless, the question of 
whether good governance has a direct 
impact on dividends paid arises. In fact, 
dividend policy is an expensive policy 
where companies must provide significant 
funds. Based on the signaling theory, 
having good governance is expected to 
reduce the expensive policies in the form 
of dividend payments; therefore, company 
funds can be used to carry out other 
investment activities that will increase 
company value. For this reason, this study 
will examine the effects of corporate 
governance on dividends directly or 
whether corporate governance affects 
dividends through company performance 
variables. 
This study also used two control 
variables, namely debt and company size 
(Ahmed, Shakoor, Khan, & Ullah, 2021). 
These two control variables were used 
because of the research gap in the existing 
studies. Several studies reveal that the use 
of debt gives a positive result on 
performance so that it also has a positive 
impact on dividend payments (Al Farooque 
et al., 2020; Benjamin & Biswas, 2019; 
Nguyen Trong & Nguyen, 2020). 
However, some studies state that when a 
company has debt, creditors will carry out 
supervision to the company so that the 
dividend function as a signal of the 
company's condition can be reduced (Al-
Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016; Christianto, 
Murhadi, & Wijaya, 2021; Tekin & Polat, 
2020). The use of company size can 
positively affect performance and 
dividends, where large-sized companies 
tend to have stable performance and pay 
higher dividends (Baker, Dewasiri, 
Premaratne, & Yatiwelle Koralalage, 2020; 
Benjamin & Biswas, 2019; Nguyen Trong 
& Nguyen, 2020; Tekin & Polat, 2020).  
Meanwhile, some argue that analysts and 
investors relatively pay more attention to 
large-sized companies, so that the dividend 
function as a signal of the company’s 
condition will decrease (Asali, Murhadi, & 
Sutejo, 2020; Christianto et al., 2021; 
Rajput & Jhunjhunwala, 2019; Sarwar, 
Xiao, Husnain, & Naheed, 2018). This 
research was conducted in three ASEAN 
countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, which have similar governance 
characteristics. The three countries were 
selected because the law enforcement in 
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these three countries is still weak (Al 
Farooque et al., 2020). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many theories discuss corporate 
governance, including agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, 
resource dependence theory, and social 
contract theory (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; 
Buallay, 2019; Frynas & Stephens, 2015; 
Khalid, Haron, & Masron, 2018; Moriarty, 
2016; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, & Withers, 
2018). This study used agency theory to 
explain corporate governance that exists 
within the company. 
In developing countries, research on 
corporate governance is very important. 
Developing countries where law enforce-
ment is still selective will have an impact 
on weak protection for public investors (Al 
Farooque et al., 2020). This is the reason 
why corporate governance in developing 
countries is an interesting thing to study. 
Based on the agency theory, a good 
corporate governance strategy is expected 
to reduce agency costs. One of the 
strategies for corporate governance is the 
separation between the executive who 
makes decisions and the supervisor 
responsible for monitoring the implemen-
tation in the company.  In Indonesia, this 
separation is known as a two-tier system, 
where the party responsible for running the 
company is the Board of Directors as the 
top management, while the party which 
supervises it is known as the Board of 
Commissioners that represents the share-
holders. 
Good corporate governance is 
committed to protecting the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders. Corporate 
governance has three objectives: accounta-
bility, supervision of financial reports, and 
increasing value for shareholders (Koh, 
Laplante, & Tong, 2007). Accountability 
and supervision of financial reports will 
result in better transparency and disclosure 
of information, thereby reducing conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and top 
management (Suttipun, 2018). This will 
have an impact on all shareholders being 
able to access important information so 
that the result can be an increase in 
company value (Velnampy, 2013). 
Companies with good governance are 
expected to be able to produce a good 
performance, which later will result in high 
dividends. 
Board of Director, Company Perfor-
mance and Dividends 
Corporate governance can be seen 
using various approaches, one of which is 
the Board of Directors, who acts as a 
supervisor of the company. There are three 
dimensions in this study that represent the 
board of directors: board size, independent 
board, and female board. 
Board size is one indicator that is 
often used in research. The large size of the 
board of commissioners is expected to 
provide better supervision to management. 
The agency theory indeed suggests 
that the size of the board of commissioners 
must be sufficient to obtain various points 
of view in supervising the company. With 
a large number and a variety of 
competencies, top management's super-
vision will be good so that information 
asymmetry between public shareholders 
and management can be reduced (Puni & 
Anlesinya, 2020). Despite several studies 
that reveal negative results because a large 
size will make coordination and communi-
cation more difficult (Christianto et al., 
2021), most studies still support agency 
theory. 
The next dimension of the board of 
commissioners is the existence of an 
independent board. An independent board 
that does not have a relationship with the 
company can perform independent super-
vision. Usually, an independent board is 
filled with people who have the expertise, 
experience, and knowledge about the 
company's business so that it is expected to 
help the company in achieving its best 
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performance. The existence of a large 
number of independent boards will be able 
to encourage the disclosure of company 
information so that it will reduce 
information asymmetry. The existence of 
many independent boards will have an 
impact on good company performance; 
thereby, they can provide higher dividend 
payments (Seputro, Murhadi, & 
Herlambang, 2020). The independence of 
the board of commissioners is also an 
essential part of implementing good 
corporate governance. With the obligation 
to have at least an independent board, it is 
hoped that company supervision will be 
more optimal (Muntahanah, Kusuma, 
Harjito, & Arifin, 2021). Buachoom (2017) 
states that an independent board will 
increase company performance, but CEO 
duality will reduce company performance. 
One of the corporate governance 
dimensions being discussed a lot is the 
female board. Research on the role of 
females in company supervision is done by 
Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng (2011) where the 
existence of female directors will increase 
supervision and advice to the management 
team. The presence of female directors will 
increase the effectiveness of supervision so 
that it will reduce agency costs. The impact 
of reducing agency costs will reduce the 
risk of company failure (Benjamin & 
Biswas, 2019). With good supervision by 
the female director, it is expected that the 
company's performance will improve and 
the dividends paid will also be higher. 
Ownership Structure, Company Perfor-
mance, and Dividends 
The ownership structure is one of the 
critical factors that can reduce agency 
problems in the company. Unification 
between ownership and control will result 
in top management having less pressure 
from external investors who inquire for 
accountability and disclosure of company 
information (Saidat et al., 2019). In this 
study, the ownership structure is seen 
through managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership. 
Managerial ownership can reduce 
agency conflicts between shareholders and 
top management. With share ownership by 
top management, management also has a 
position as a shareholder so that this 
conflict can be reduced and has an impact 
on better performance and higher 
dividends paid. These positive results are 
supported by Buachoom (2017) and 
Farooque et al. (2019). However, some 
studies show the opposite results. High 
managerial ownership will encourage top 
management to maintain retained earnings 
which will be used for business develop-
ment rather than distributing it in 
dividends. Business development will have 
the impact of increasing the company size 
so that management compensation will 
increase, and at the same time, the success 
of business development will increase the 
company's share price, which makes the 
manager who is also the owner of the 
company to get capital gains. These 
findings are supported by Hadi, Murhadi, 
& Sutejo (2020) and Mili, Sahut, & 
Teulon's (2017) studies. 
Institutional ownership is portrayed 
as an important part of corporate 
governance. Companies that institutions 
own tend to be better monitored because 
the institutions have the competencies and 
skills to supervise the actions taken by 
management. Institutions that have good 
quality human resources will be able to 
supervise and correct management actions. 
Good supervision is expected to have an 
impact on a good performance and high 
dividend payments. However, the results of 
research related to institutional ownership 
of earnings and dividends have different 
results. Some studies that support a 
positive relationship are (Firth, Gao, Shen, 
& Zhang, 2016; Jeon, Lee, & Moffett, 
2011; Kim, Eppler-Kim, Kim, & Byun, 
2010). In comparison, Rajput & 
Jhunjhunwala (2019) and Asali et al. ( 
2020) support a negative effect of 
institutional ownership on performance or 
dividends. Asali et al. (2021) argue that a 
company with high institutional ownership 
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will reduce dividend payments considering 
that the tax on dividends is higher, as 
stated in the tax preference theory. 
The results of the study state that 
corporate governance affects performance 
and dividends, and research model is 
presented in Figure 1. The following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H1:  Board Size has a positive effect on 
performance and dividends; 
H2:  Independent Board has a positive 
effect on performance; 
H3:  Female Board has a positive effect 
on performance; 
H4:  Managerial ownership has a positive 
effect on performance; 
H5:  Institutional ownership has a positive 
effect on performance; 
H6:  Board Size has a positive effect on 
dividends; 
H7:  Independent Board has a positive 
effect on dividends; 
H8:  Female Board has a positive effect 
on dividends; 
H9:  Managerial ownership has a positive 
effect on dividends; 
H10:  Institutional ownership has a positive 
effect on dividends; 
H11:  Financial performance has a positive 
effect on dividends. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study used data from manu-
facturing sector companies listed on three 
main ASEAN Stock Exchanges, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The 
study used five-year data over the 2015-
2019 periods, including all companies that 
are members of the manufacturing sector 
in each country. The number of 
observations for Indonesia reached 420 
years of observation, while Malaysia 
reached 530 years of observation, and 
Thailand reached 450 years of observation. 
This study used path analysis with the 
dependent variable used is dividends as 
measured by the dividend payout ratio 
(DPR). The mediation variable in this 
study was a financial performance as 
measured by return on assets, while the 
independent variables used were corporate 
governance comprising the size of the 
board of commissioners (BS), the 
percentage of independent commissioners 
(BI), and female commissioners (BW), and 
the ownership structure represented by the 
percentage of managerial ownership (MO) 
and the percentage of institutional 
ownership (IO). This study also used two 
control variables: debt ratio (DR) and 
company size (FS). The research models 
are: 
                              
                       ……....(1) 
                              
                           …(2) 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
This study used panel data in three 
countries for five years. This study tested 
whether GCG has an effect on perfor-
mance and dividends and whether financial 
performance affects dividends. From the 
results of data processing, descriptive 
statistics for each country are presented 
Table 1. From the table, it can be seen that 
the highest mean of dividend payers is in 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the highest mean 
of ROA is Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia, respectively. This indicates that 
although the mean of ROA is the highest in 
Indonesia, the percentage of dividend 
payments is the lowest, this may be due to 
the immense market potential in Indonesia, 
which makes companies set aside their 
profits for business development. 
From Table 2 that exhibits the 
correlation between variables, it can be 
seen that no multicollinearity between 
variables in Indonesia. From Table 3 that 
exhibits the correlation between variables, 
it can be seen that no multicollinearity 
between variables in Malaysia. From Table 
4 that exhibits the correlation between 
variables, it can be seen that no 
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multicollinearity between variables in 
Thailand.  
Table 5 exhibits the results of the 
data processing. From Table 5, it can be 
seen that in Indonesia, for Model 1, only 
debt and company size have a significant 
effect on performance. In Indonesia, only 
hypothesis 11 in Model 2 is supported, 
signifying that performance has a positive 
effect on dividends paid. As measured 
either by board characteristics or 
ownership structure, good governance 
variables have no effect on performance 
and dividends. In comparison, in Malaysia, 
for Model 1, it can be seen that board 
characteristics proxied by the female board 
have a positive effect both on performance 
and dividends. The presence of female 
commissioners will further enhance 
supervision and prudence so that the 
company's performance will be better. This 
good performance also has an impact on 
increasing dividend payments. Besides, in 
Malaysia, company size has a positive 
effect on financial performance. Large-
sized companies will obtain economies of 
scale in their operations so that costs 
become smaller and lead to higher 
company performance. 
In Malaysia, for Model 2, there is a 
consistent result: female board and 
company size have a positive effect on 
dividends. Besides, also for Model 2, it is 
found that financial performance has a 
positive effect on dividends paid. 
Meanwhile, in Thailand, both Models 1 
and 2 show that institutional ownership 
and debt have a negative effect on financial 
performance and dividends. 
The data processing results in Table 
5 show that for Model 1, variables that 
affect company performance (ROA) are 
debt and company size in Indonesia, 
female board and company size in 
Malaysia, and institutional ownership and 
debt in Thailand. An interesting result 
occurs in Indonesia, where all governance 
variables have no effect on profitability. 
This may indicate that governance 
implementation in Indonesia tends only to 
follow the rules set by self-regulatory 
organizations. The results in Indonesia are 
opposite to the results in Malaysia, where 
female board has a positive effect on 
company profitability. 
This supports the hypothesis that the 
existence of female directors will increase 
supervision and advice to the management 
team. The presence of female directors will 
increase the effectiveness of supervision, 
thereby reduce agency costs. Meanwhile, 
the results for Model 1 in Thailand for 
governance variables show that only 
institutional ownership has a negative 
effect on company performance (ROA). 
The negative effect of institutional 
ownership on company performance 
implies that increasing institutional 
ownership can lead to earning management 
practices that aim at reducing the taxes 
paid. This means that the company can use 
earnings management to exhibit low 
performance so that the tax burden paid is 
also low. 
For Model 2 in Indonesia, consistent 
results as in Model 1 are found where 
governance has no effect on dividend 
policy. Besides, also for Model 2, it is 
found that only profit, debt, and company 
size have an effect on dividend policy. 
Profit has a significant positive result 
where with the increasing profit, the 
company tends to pay more dividends. 
Meanwhile, for the debt variable, negative 
results are obtained, where high debt will 
have an effect on the payment of higher 
obligations to creditors so that dividends 
available for distribution are limited. For 
company size in Indonesia, a significant 
positive result is found, implying that 
large-sized companies tend to pay higher 
dividends than small-sized companies. 
For Model 2 in Malaysia, consistent 
results as in Model 1 are found where 
governance has no effect on dividends 
paid. Besides, also for Model 2, female 
board, company size, and profitability have 
a positive effect on dividend policy. The 
results in Malaysia support the hypothesis 
that females will drive better performance 
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and the impact is higher dividend 
payments. The results of this study also 
support the statement that good 
performance companies (High ROA) will 
make companies able to distribute more 
dividends than poor performance 
companies. For company size, consistent 
results as in Indonesia that show large-
sized companies tend to pay higher 
dividends than small sized companies are 
found. 
The results also show that debt has a 
negative effect on performance and 
dividends paid in the three countries. This 
result contradicts the Kim & Shin (2021) 
study, which gave positive results for 
Tobins Q.  This signifies that an increase in 
debt will lead to an increase in interest 
expenses and principal installments so that 
it will decrease performance. The decrease 
in the performance itself will affect the 
dividends paid, where if the performance 
decreases, the dividends paid will also 
decrease. Debt also has a negative effect 
on direct dividend payments. Increased 
debt leads to an increase in debtor 
supervision so that the dividend function as 
a signal to investors is reduced, as is 
known as the substitution argument in 
dividend policy. A significant positive 
result is found in Indonesia and Malaysia 
for company size, but not significant in 
Thailand. From the study results, it is 
found that there is a positive effect 
between performance and dividend policy 
in Indonesia and Malaysia, but not proven 
to be significant in Thailand. 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Three Countries 
Variable Indonesia Malaysia Thailand 
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
DPR 0.33 0.00 5.23 0.35 0.00 3.39 0.61 0.00 4.48 
BS 4.35 2.00 12.0 4.39 2.00 10.0 6.26 2.00 14.0 
BI 0.42 0.20 0.80 0.79 0.29 1.00 0.72 0.30 1.00 
BW 0.11 0.00 0.75 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 
MO 0.04 0.00 0.38 0.11 0.00 0.64 0.19 0.00 0.75 
IO 0.67 0.03 0.99 0.55 0.02 0.96 0.37 0.00 0.95 
ROA 0.07 -0.12 0.92 0.05 -0.79 0.75 0.06 -0.23 0.32 
DR 0.41 0.07 0.82 0.34 0.04 0.77 0.32 0.00 0.80 
FS 12.49 11.13 14.5 12.20 11.06 13.9 28.30 26.17 33.3 
Corporate Governance: 
A. Board characteristics  
1. Board Size (BS)  
2. Independent Board (BI)  
3. Board Gender (BG) 
B. Ownership Structure  
1. Managerial Ownership (MO) 








1. Debt (DR) 
2. Firm Size (FS) 
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Table 2. Correlation Coefficient for Indonesia 
 DPR BS BI BW MO IO ROA DR FS 
DPR 1.00         
BS 0.17 1.00        
BI 0.06 -0.02 1.00       
BW -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 1.00      
MO -0.09 -0.17 -0.06 0.02 1.00     
IO 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.41 1.00    
ROA 0.22 0.11 0.21 -0.09 -0.04 0.15 1.00   
DR -0.11 0.16 0.14 0.23 -0.20 0.06 -0.12 1.00  
FS 0.23 0.65 0.06 -0.03 -0.30 -0.06 0.17 0.26 1.00 
 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficient for Malaysia 
 DPR BS BI BW MO IO ROA DR FS 
DPR 1.00         
BS 0.09 1.00        
BI -0.05 -0.55 1.00       
BW 0.11 0.01 -0.14 1.00      
MO -0.08 -0.22 0.10 0.03 1.00     
IO 0.10 0.18 -0.06 0.05 -0.57 1.00    
ROA 0.32 0.08 -0.05 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 1.00   
DR 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.20 0.06 1.00  
FS 0.15 0.34 -0.22 -0.01 -0.28 0.32 0.06 0.26 1.00 
 
Table 4. Correlation Coefficient for Thailand 
 DPR BS BI BW MO IO ROA DR FS 
DPR 1.00         
BS -0.07 1.00        
BI 0.05 -0.70 1.00       
BW -0.04 0.01 -0.05 1.00      
MO -0.01 -0.15 0.17 -0.08 1.00     
IO -0.06 0.11 0.05 -0.04 -0.64 1.00    
ROA 0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.12 1.00   
DR -0.12 -0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.21 -0.10 -0.35 1.00  
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CONCLUSION 
From this study, it can be concluded 
that corporate governance does not affect 
both company performance and dividend 
policy paid to manufacturing companies in 
Indonesia. Female director has a positive 
effect on company performance and 
dividends paid to manufacturing compa-
nies in Malaysia. Meanwhile, institutional 
ownership has a negative effect on 
company performance and dividend policy 
in Thailand. This study results also show 
that debt has a negative effect on both 
company performance and dividends in the 
three countries. Meanwhile, company size 
has a positive effect on performance and 
dividends on stock exchanges in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. 
These results imply that the 
implementation of corporate governance in 
Indonesia is still limited to compliance 
with existing regulations. This has an 
impact on relatively weak investor 
protection. In comparison, in Malaysia, 
corporate governance with a focus on 
board characteristics turns out that the 
presence of female will have a positive 
impact on company performance and 
dividends paid to investors. Meanwhile, in 
Thailand, the study results imply that 
institutional ownership tends to have a 
negative impact on performance and 
dividends. 
Further research that can be carried 
out is to include earning management in 
companies with high institutional 
ownership variables. In Thailand, high 
institutional ownership has a negative 
effect on performance and dividends; it is 
alleged that the company carried out 
earning management in order to reduce 
taxes. Future research can also include the 
family ownership variables, considering 
that many companies in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand are family-owned. 
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